Genetically engineered (GE) crops are subject to regulatory oversight to ensure their safety for humans and the environment. Their approval in the European Union (EU) starts with an application in a given Member State followed by a scientific risk assessment, and ends with a political decision-making step (risk management). In the United States (US) approval begins with a scientific (field trial) step and ends with a 'bureaucratic' decision-making step. We investigate trends for the time taken for these steps and the overall time taken for approving GE crops in the US and the EU. Our results show that from 1996-2015 the overall time trend for approval in the EU decreased and then flattened off, with an overall mean completion-time of 1,763 days.
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Introduction
Genetically engineered (GE) crops are innovations that need to clear all regulatory hurdles of a given jurisdiction before they can be commercialized-a time-consuming process. In theory, these regulations ("governmental oversight") are used by governments to ensure the safety of new biotech products for humans and the environment (Lynch and Vogel, 2001) .
Complying with regulations is costly (Davison, 2010; Miller and Bradford, 2010) (the mean total cost of introducing a new GE crop for the period 2008-2012 was US$ 136 M of which US$ 35.01 M (25.8%) were for meeting regulatory requirements (regulatory science (US$ 17.9 M); registration and regulatory affairs (US$ 17.2 M)) (Phillips McDougall, 2011) . Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2007) identified compliance costs for insect resistant and herbicide tolerant maize of US$ 7.1-15.4 M and US$ 6.2-14.5 M, respectively, often affordable only by large private organizations (Bradford et al., 2005; Giddings et al., 2013) .
Numerous investigations have shown a spectrum of benefits (pecuniary, non-pecuniary, and environmental) of adopting first generation GE crops (e.g. Benbrook, 2012; Bennett et al., 2013; Mannion and Morse, 2013; Brookes and Barfoot, 2014) . A meta-analysis by Klümper and Qaim (2014) shows that "the average agronomic and economic benefits of GM [(genetically modified)] crops are large and significant". Second-generation GE crops such as micronutrient enriched food crops are expected to improve the health, life-expectancy, and welfare of especially impoverished consumers (Wesseler and Zilberman, 2014; De Steur et al., 2015) .
The international regulatory framework is fragmented (Vigani and Olper, 2015) and "highly heterogeneous" because of differences, inter alia, in standards for genetically modified organisms, endogenous policy and the market for information, which affects welfare distribution (Vigani and Olper, 2013) . Delays in authorizing GE crops postpone their benefits and cause economic losses in foregone profits. Losses are further exaggerated by asynchronous approval processes, which cause market disruptions (Vigani et al., 2012) , and lead to strained trading relations (Henseler et al., 2013; de Faria and Wieck, 2015; De Steur et al., 2015) that in some cases have escalated to formal international disputes (Punt and Wesseler, 2015) . Potential environmental and human health benefits are also delayed (Wesseler et al., 2011) .
The period for applications successfully moving through the GE crop regulatory pipeline, extended by unforeseen regulatory delays, and the asynchrony in approval between trading partners, is of economic importance for participants in a new GE crop's value chain (Stein and Rodríguez-Cerezo, 2009; Nowicki et al., 2010) . In their study on the cost of compliance in the Philippines, Bayer et al. (2010) note that a country's regulatory costs appear to fall over time as experience is gained, while regulatory costs are lower for products that have already been approved elsewhere (and by implication, regulatory time is shorter). These authors conclude that: "the largest potential constraint to commercialization … is regulatory delay". Temporal aspects of regulations have socio-political implications for their regulators and policy evolution due to the opposing pressures exerted on this 'ecosystem' by the antagonists and protagonists of this type of green biotechnology who lobby for more lenient and stricter regulations, respectively. Antagonists have contributed to regulatory delays through legal recourse (DeFrancesco, 2013) , state action (e.g. the de facto moratorium in the European Union (EU) lasting from 1998-2004 (Cararu, 2009; Davison, 2010) ), and social protest activities such as destroying field trials (Bonneuil et al., 2008; Morris and Spillane, 2010) .
We investigate the time taken for GE crops to pass through the regulatory pipelines of the United States (US) and the EU-"first movers" worldwide in implementing regulations for GE crops (Vigani and Olper, 2015) and important trading partners in these commodities. We identify the trends that have developed since the first GE crop was approved in the US, and provide an improved understanding of the time taken for each regulatory step in these jurisdictions. We deliberately avoid any statistical comparison of the two region's total approval time (see 2.4 below).
Because the 'economic clock' theoretically never stops, we ignore any technical stoppages that a 'regulatory clock' might accommodate (e.g. regulators' requests for additional information).
We add to current knowledge (The European Association for Bioindustries, 2011) by giving an updated analysis of the time taken for GE crops to be approved by analyzing: (1) each step in the regulatory 'path' for its contribution to the overall regulatory process, and (2) crop characteristics' impact on regulatory time.
In the next section we describe the regulatory processes in the US and EU to show their differences and similarities and to set the scene for our research method. In the Analysis section we describe the data we used and the statistical analyses done. Thereafter we discuss our results and end by giving our conclusions.
The Regulation of GE Crops in the US and the EU
Introduction
Although a new GE crop typically follows a seven-stage development process (see Phillips
McDougall, 2012), regulatory oversight in the US begins with stage six involving the scientific evaluation of a new crop's safety and ends in a 'bureaucratic' decision-making step. In the EU however, there is an additional political decision-making step (Lynch and Vogel, 2001; Davison, 2010) .
US
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) takes the lead role for approving GE crops, and is supported by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1986) . We consider the start of the regulatory process (i.e. when the 'economic clock' starts) to be when a developer first seeks permission at the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for conducting field trials on a regulated article-the name for GE crops not yet approved-irrespective of when its first field trial actually starts. This 'scientific' (field trial) step ends when the developer submits its petition dossier to the APHIS petitioning for non-regulated status, which in turn marks the beginning of the 'bureaucratic' step during which the scientific evidence of its safety is assessed. This step ends when the regulated article is assigned non-regulated status. The petitioner is then legally permitted to market the GE crop. Details of this process up to the end of February 2012 are shown in Figure S1 in the on-line appendix. From March 2012 the process was changed to facilitate earlier public involvement, and the way in which public comments are solicited and used ( Figure S2 , on-line) (USDA APHIS, 2012).
EU
The EU's approval process is legally guided by the precautionary principle, and commences for the purposes of our study when a developer applies to its Member State's competent authority for approving a GE crop. Approval is for a specific use, e.g. 'cultivation', and or 'food and or feed', and or 'import and processing', or any combination of these. (EC, 2016) .
If the SCFCAH rejects the draft decision or expresses a 'no opinion', the EC either amends its draft decision and resubmits it to the SCFCAH or submits the original draft decision to the Appeal Committee-a more senior level of Member State representation-for a decision (EC, 2015) , also by qualified majority voting. Similarly, approval is declined if the draft decision is rejected, but if a 'no opinion' is expressed, the EC may adopt the decision, i.e. approval will be granted ( Figure S3 from Smart et al., 2015, on-line) . The 'political' step, and therefore the approval process, stops when the Commission reaches its decision (Davison, 2010) . We considered the combined duration of the Member State-application, the 'risk assessment', and the political decision-making steps to be the total duration of the EU's approval process.
Most ( only. Due to the low number (two applications for cultivation) of observations in our study, we excluded a 'field trial' step for our EU analysis.
Synthesis
It is tempting to make a direct comparison of the approval length between the US and the EU.
However, a direct comparison is insensible. The approval system of the US starts with a 'scientific' step characterised by field trials and ends with a 'bureaucratic' step for assessing the applicant's petition, while that of the EU starts when a developer applies to its Member State for approval for one or more specific uses (see 2.3 above), followed by a 'risk assessment' step (similar to the US's 'bureaucratic' step), ending in a political decision-making process. Some of the information generated for approval in the EU relies on information generated for the approval process in the US.
Further, applications in the US almost always include field trials as applications include cultivation, while the majority of the applications for approval in the EU are for "import and processing" and not for "cultivation" (Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes, 2011) . Thus, we avoid a statistical comparison of their total approval time as it would be theoretically flawed. Rather, we focus on trends exhibited in each system separately.
Analysis
We investigate the completion-time for the steps involved in the approval of GE crops in the US and the EU, and assume that the arithmetic sum of these steps is the total duration of each jurisdiction's approval process. Because we are dealing with an 'economic' rather than a 'regulatory' clock, we do not account for stoppages. We sourced our data for all newly approved GE crops (i.e. excluding renewals) until December 2015 (the end of our study period) from internetbased databases and journals. step by cross-referencing the permit number of a GE plant's earliest field trial (published in its petition dossier) with the BRS's online permit information database (USDA, 2016b), which also contains the other dates we use. We use each regulated article's petition number for finding the dates when its dossier (petition document) was submitted to the APHIS-marking the end of the 'scientific' step and the start of the 'bureaucratic' step-and when non-regulated status was awarded: this signaling the conclusion of the 'bureaucratic' decision-making step, and the entire regulatory process.
The non-regulated status for two glyphosate-tolerant GE crops (alfalfa (events J101 and J163) and sugar beet (event H7-1)) was temporarily suspended due to legal action resulting in their developers having to submit an environmental impact statement; these delays were irrelevant to our empirical analysis as they occurred after their original approvals (USDA APHIS, 2010; 2011), and therefore were excluded. As most of the plants in our dataset are annuals, we excluded the field trial data for perennial crops, but included the time taken for their petitions to be reviewed in our analysis of the 'bureaucratic' step. There are no field trial data available for two annuals (flax (CDC Triffid) and soybean (BPS-CV127-9)), whose trials were done outside of the US.
For the EU, we investigate all GE crops listed on the GMO Compass website's database (GMO Compass, 2016) classified as having a risk assessment report (i.e. the 'scientific-' but not the 'political' step is complete), and a valid authorization (i.e. approved), complemented by notices published in the journal: Agrafacts (Agrafacts, 2015) . We cross-reference our list with the EFSA's scientific opinion/s and the Commission's decision in the EFSA Journal and the Official Journal of the European Communities, respectively. We find the following dates for each application:
submission for authorization to the EU Member State (start of the Member State-application step); EU Member State submission to the EFSA (end of the Member State-application step; start of the scientific 'risk assessment' step); the EFSA's date of adopting the application (end of the 'risk assessment' step; start of 'political' step); and the date when the Commission reached its decision for approving the GE crop (end of 'political' step, and the entire regulatory process). Where the complete date for the start of the Member State-application step is not published, we assume the date to be the fifteenth day of the month during which its application was submitted to the relevant Member State, and we exclude events where no evidence of a date was found from this step's analysis. Tables 1 and 2 show general trends of the regulatory processes, apparently getting longer in the US (the overall trend has a structural break dividing it into an 'early-' and 'late' period, discussed in more detail below) and shorter in the EU.
<< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >> << INSERT TABLE 2 HERE >>
Empirical Analysis
US
We collected data for 95 observations (applications), all of which except one (awaiting the outcome of the 'bureaucratic' step) are now deregulated. Table 3 presents summary statistics of this dataset.
From an initial analysis of our data we identified a structural break in the trend for the time taken to approve GE crops (Table 1 , Figure S4 , on-line). We used the start date for each application for identifying two groups of applications separated by this break: (1) 'early' (up to and including 1997), and (2) 'late' (1998 onwards), representing 44% and 56% of observations, respectively. USbased and foreign developers submitted 75% and 25% of the applications, respectively, whereas 69% and 31% of the applications were for single-and multiple trait events, respectively. 51% of the genetic modifications were for herbicide tolerance; 32% for insect resistance; and 32% for other genetic modifications such as viral resistance, freeze-tolerance, and quality improvement traits (e.g.
reduced browning of apples, and reduced lignin content of alfalfa). The majority (79%) of GE plants were developed for food production; only 21% were developed for non-food purposes. GE varieties of maize were the most abundant (32%); followed by soy bean (18%); cotton (17%);
tomato, and potato (6% each); the remaining 21% comprised alfalfa, apple, sugar beet, chicory, creeping bentgrass, eucalyptus, papaya, rice, rose, squash, and tobacco.
<< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE >>
We investigated if the structural break mentioned above also holds in a multivariate regression framework. Theoretically, what appears to be a structural break may be a sudden shift in the type of application, for example the characteristic of a GE plant like its lifecycle, i.e., a shift from annual to perennial. Alternatively, the political 'climate' may have caused a shift, thus erroneously indicating a structural break, which was actually the result of unobserved factors. We used a set of ordinary least squares regression models for testing if differences in the regulatory process' time-line could be explained by plant characteristics or an external, independent factor(s) ( Figure S4 , on-line)
We identified two periods ('early' and 'late') separated in 1998 by a structural break. We captured differences in the time taken for applications completing the 'scientific' step, 'bureaucratic' step, and the overall approval process, by including dichotomous variables.
Subsequently, we included additional control variables for netting out effects unrelated to the structural break, such as differences in time taken between applications grouped according to the following parameters: developer's domicile (domestic or foreign developer); use (food or non-food plants); and the number of GE traits that each crop has (single or multiple). If the variable identifying 'early' and 'late' applications reflect a substantial and statistically significant difference after adding controls, our interpretation is that evidence for a structural break exists. Table S5 (on-line) illustrates the results of our regression models designed to net out effects unrelated to the structural break. Model 1 (baseline model) suggests that submissions made before the structural break took 38% less time (504 days) 2 to complete the scientific step -a robust estimate as it remained almost unaffected by the additional explanatory variables. In model 5, the minimal estimate, 'early' applications took 37% less time (496 days) than applications submitted during the 'late' period. For the 'scientific' step, neither a developer's domicile nor the genetic trait multiple contributed to differences in regulatory time. Model 5 indicates that there are no substantial differences in regulatory time between potatoes, tomatoes, soy beans, and maize plants;
conversely, plants we subsume under 'other crops' took less time for approval compared with maize.
We performed a similar set of analyses for the time taken for a petition passing through the US's 'bureaucratic' step (Table S6 , on-line). Petitions from 'early' applications have a substantial time advantage according to model 1-our baseline model. 'Late' period petitions took 679 days (144%) longer to be approved: a robust result for all the models. Petitions from foreign-based developers and for multiple traits took slightly longer than for local developers and single traits, respectively, but some of the corresponding coefficients are statistically insignificant. We detected no difference between herbicide tolerant and insect resistant crops. We performed the same set of tests on the total approval time (Table S7 , on-line). The most striking discovery is that one or more events or factors around 1998 triggered a delay in the US's approval process, i.e. developers who applied to the APHIS from 1998 onwards for permission to conduct field trials for the first time on a new GE crop, spent 1,146 days longer (63%; model 1) in the regulatory pipeline than had permission for their crop's field trials been applied for in 1997 or earlier.
EU
We collected data for 65 observations (applications) of which 62 were approved. Table 4 presents these data. The oldest and most recent applications for starting the Member State-application step were submitted in 1996 and 2012, respectively; 32% and 68% of the applications were by local and foreign (mostly the US) developers, respectively. 51% of the applications were for single-and 49%
for multiple-trait GE crops. In 72% and 51% of the cases, GE modifications were for herbicide tolerance and insect resistance, respectively, while 16% were for 'other' traits. Most of the applications were for 'food and feed' (88%), while 12% were for industrial and other purposes (only two applications were for cultivation). Maize has the most applications (51%); followed by soy beans (21%); cotton (12%); potato (3%); with the remaining 13% comprising: sugar beet, flowers, and rice.
<< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE >>
We followed a similar strategy for testing the robustness of the trend observed in Figure S5 (online): a convex development for the overall approval time, with long durations for submissions during 1996 and 1998, and the absence of a clear trend for the remaining period. We modelled this relationship in model 1, our baseline model, with two metric variables: 'year' and the 'square of the year' expecting them to have negative and positive signs, respectively, indicating the aforementioned convex-shaped relationship. Signs and sizes of the variables: 'year' and 'year (squared)' confirm the development of a convex shape (Table S8 , on-line). We added variables for controlling other potential effects such as the developer's domicile; the crop's GE trait; and the crop's intended use ('food and feed' vs. non-food/feed). We found that some crop features are correlated with the time taken to complete the Member State-application step: applications for maize took 82% (15 days) longer than those for soy beans, while applications with the trait insect resistance took 150% (88 days) longer than those for herbicide tolerance. Similarly, applications for non-food/feed took 208% (559 days) longer than those for 'food and feed' purposes.
For the 'risk assessment' step we used a linear-only time variable and found that the corresponding coefficient suggests a statistically significant, positive slope (Table S9 , on-line). This coefficient is robust in models 1-4, but loses robustness when crop type is included (model 5). We used maize as our reference category and found that only applications for cotton, soy beans and 'other plant' category correlate with the time taken to complete the 'risk assessment' step and that these crops took 53% and 35% longer and 43% less time compared with maize, respectively.
Results presented in longer for these applications, respectively, compared with maize.
When analyzing the total time for approving a GE crop, we expect the regression results to conform to the result of the Member State-application step. Results presented in Table S11 (on-line) confirm the concave trend in overall approval time; coefficients in all models are statistically significant and all have the expected signs. Comparing these results with those in Tables S8-S10 (on-line) suggests that the Member State-application step drives the reduction in approval time; the 'risk assessment' and 'political' steps contribute to the overall time, but only marginally (if anything) to the observed changes in duration.
Single trait applications required 15-22% less time (206-375 days), confirming earlier findings shown in Table S9 (on-line); applications for potatoes and cotton took about 54% (1,273 days) and 49% (1,021 days) longer, respectively. For the overall time, we find no robust evidence for statistically significant differences between domestic and foreign developers, herbicide tolerant and insecticide resistant crops, or 'food and feed' and non-food/feed crops.
US-EU Contrasts
The regulatory systems of the US and EU are inherently different (see Section 2). No applications in our dataset were submitted simultaneously in both jurisdictions. Applications in the US include cultivation as a use in distinct contrast to the EU where only two applications were for this purpose.
We avoid drawing direct comparisons of the total time taken for GE crops passing through these regulatory pipelines because it is theoretically flawed due to endogenous inconsistencies. However, because the 'bureaucratic' step in the US is similar to the EU's 'risk assessment' step, we computed the mean time taken for the same GE events, a subset of 26, to have completed these steps (all of the events in this subset were approved in the US first; their subsequent applications in the EU were for 'import' and or 'food and feed' use), yielding 686 days in the US compared with 995 days in the EU, a difference of 309 days.
Results and Discussion
Generally, the development and commercialization of new GE crops is hampered by slow and costly approval processes (Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2007) . A trend towards shorter approval times in a given regulatory system is expected (Pray et al., 2005) , as experience with the different steps in the approval process, in scientific research, and the commercialization of GE crops is gained with time, thus allowing efficiencies to develop (Bradford et al., 2005; Giddings et al., 2013 Figure S4 , on-line). This break in the trend coincides with a number of disruptive events in the biotechnology arena. Examples from the US include the Prodigene (Federation of American Scientists, 2011) and StarLink (Carter and Smith, 2007) incidents, and the monarch butterfly controversy; and from the EU, which is an important trade destination of GE products from the US: the researcher Pusztai's work on the health effect of GM potatoes on rats; the de facto moratorium on new GE crop authorizations spawning new legislation (explicitly incorporating the precautionary principle and broadening the criteria for risk assessments) (Devos et al., 2006) ; "debates over Dolly the sheep and GM crops and food" (Bauer, 2002) , and the occurrence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 3 . Interestingly, a similar phenomenon occurred with the worldwide number of active new GE product quality innovations in the agricultural biotechnology arena, which grew exponentially until 1998 when its declining trend suddenly levelled off (Graff et al., 2009) .
It is surprising that over time, the EU's approval process has tended to shorten ( Figure S5 , online), as there is considerable consumer and political resistance to adopting GE crops in this region, which is heterogeneous in terms of attitudes towards GE crops (Devos et al., 2006) . In the EU, it is permissible for developers to reference data or "notifications previously submitted by other notifiers" (Council Directive 2001/18/EC) when conducting their scientific investigations-a positive information spill-over effect. The duration of the 'risk assessment' step has tended to increase ( Figure S5 (b) , on-line), thus finding ways to shorten this step will reduce the EU's overall regulatory time.
We found one regulatory change in the US aimed at shortening the approval time of GE crops.
An internal inquiry by the APHIS showed "competing priorities for … staff" as a probable cause for the 'bureaucratic' step taking longer (Capital Reporting Company, 2011) , which subsequently led the APHIS to introduce procedural changes to the US's petition process in 2012 (compare Figure   S1 with S2, on-line). It will be interesting to see if these alterations reach the USDA's goal of improving customer service (USDA APHIS, 2012), and by implication, regulatory efficiency-one measure of which would be the speeding up of the 'bureaucratic' step.
Conclusion
Repeated calls have been made for the regulatory trigger to be product-rather than process based An analysis of the EFSA's 'risk assessment' step is required to investigate if its completiontime can be shortened. In principle, the EU's regulatory path could end at the EFSA. However, a subsequent 'political' step exists, which, if shortened or even eliminated would also contribute to speeding up the EU's regulatory time. The 'opt-out' legislation introduced in 2015 allows Member
States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of EU-approved GE crops on their territories (Directive (EU) 215/412), which Dederer (2016) suggests adds nothing to the "additional value" of the existing framework. This policy change can accelerate the 'political' step as Member States can approve applications for cultivation at their first voting opportunity at the SCFCAH. However, it seems doubtful if this regulation will impact approval times considering the fairly rigid voting behaviour of EU Member States (Smart et al., 2015) .
Our results suggest that political decision-makers in the EU and the US should consider implementing policies making their regulatory process more affordable. This can be achieved without compromising safety. The increase in approval time seems to have been caused by events in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Human resources handling applications in the US have been reduced, which partially explains an increase in approval time. We offer two additional explanations: (1) staff handling applications may have become more cautious as a result of the events that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s; and (2) opening up the approval process for public comments in the mid-2000s slowed down approval time as those comments needed to be addressed and required additional human resources, which had already been identified as a limiting factor. Since the science did not change, such an improvement in shortening approval time would stimulate and encourage investment in agricultural innovation by smaller investors and in a broader spectrum of products-currently restricted to a few, large firms focusing their efforts both on a narrow range of crops and genetic attributes (Bradford et al., 2005) and contribute substantial economic benefits (Zilberman et al., 2015) .
The US is the locus for most of these biotech innovations (Graff et al., 2009) , from which they diffuse globally. The US's rate of commercialization of new GE crops depends not only upon its regulatory system, but also on the compliance requirements of other countries being concurrently addressed by US developers. For society to gain from these innovations earlier in countries adopting this technology, measures for speeding up their regulatory processes need to be found and implemented (Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes, 2011) . Our results support the US government's July 2015 plan for modernizing its regulatory system for biotechnology products, especially its focus on reducing regulatory burdens for small and mid-sized firms (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2015) and its subsequent announcement to review its regulations to eliminate "unnecessary regulatory burdens" in general (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2016) . If this could be achieved, not only the US but also other countries such as the EU would benefit. Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the US's dataset for the time taken for GE crops passing through the regulatory process, and those awaiting the outcome of the 'bureaucratic' step. a The sum of these coefficients is > 1.0. This is because of stacked events where one trait is represented in two categories simultaneously (e.g. herbicide tolerance and insect resistance together in a stacked event). Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the EU's dataset for the time taken for GE crops passing through the regulatory process, and those awaiting the outcome of the 'political' step. Developer's domicile *The sum of these coefficients is > 1.0, because of stacked events where one trait is represented in two categories simultaneously (e.g. herbicide tolerance and insect resistance together). parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Dependent variable is time taken in days (natural log) for completing the scientific step. Reference category refers to a non-US (foreign) based company, submitting a multiple trait and insect resistant GE plant for non-food use during the period 1998 to 2012 (model 4). parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Dependent variable is time taken in days (natural log) for passing through the scientific process. Reference category refers to a non-EU (foreign) based company, submitting a multiple trait and insect resistant GE plant (model 3). parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. Dependent variable is time taken in days (natural log) for passing through the scientific process.
Reference category refers to a non-EU (foreign) based company, submitting a multiple trait and insect resistant GE plant (model 3).
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